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This paper studies the causes and consequences of internal seasonal migration in 
northwestern Bangladesh, a region where over 5 million people live below the poverty line, and 
must cope with a pre-harvest seasonal famine almost every year (The Daily Star, 2011). This seasonal 
famine – known locally as “monga’’ – is emblematic of the widespread pre-harvest lean or “hungry” 
seasons experienced throughout South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, in which households are forced 
into extreme poverty for part of the year.1  Using a randomly assigned program to promote seasonal 
out-migration, we first document very large economic returns to migrating away in search of 
employment during the famine season.   Next we explore why the people who were induced to 
migrate by our program were not already migrating, given the positive expected returns.  This 
analysis helps us understand the role of risk aversion in preventing households from engaging in 
potentially profitable activities more broadly, especially when those households are close to 
subsistence and may have a lot to lose from experimenting with new ideas.   
The proximate causes of the famine season are easily understood – work opportunities are 
scarce between planting and harvest in agrarian areas, and grain prices rise during this period 
(Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming).  Understanding how a famine can occur every year despite 
the existence of numerous potential mitigation strategies is, however, more challenging.  We explore 
one obvious mitigation option – migration to nearby urban areas that offer better employment 
opportunities – and take a first step toward understanding whether this is a useful strategy and if so, 
why it is not employed more often.  To do so, we randomly assigned an incentive (of $8.50 or 600 
Taka, which covers the round-trip travel cost) to households conditional on seasonal migration.   
                                                 
1 Seasonal poverty has been documented in Ethiopia (Dercon & Krishnan, 2000), who show that poverty and malnourishment 
increase 27% during the lean season, Malawi and Mozambique (Brune et al., 2011) – where people refer to a “hungry season”, 
Madagascar (Dostie et al., 2002), who estimate that 1 million people fall into poverty before the rice harvest, Kenya (Swift, 1989), 
who distinguishes between years that people died versus years of less severe shortage, Senegal and Francophone Africa (the soudure 
phenomenon), Thailand (Paxson, 1993), India (Chaudhuri & Paxson, 2002) and inland China (Jalan & Ravallion, 1999). 
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The random assignment of incentives allows us to generate among the first experimental 
estimates of the effects of migration. Estimating the returns to migration is the subject of a very 
large literature, but one that has been hampered by difficult selection issues (Akee, 2010; Grogger & 
Hanson, 2011; Gibson et al., forthcoming).2  We estimate large returns: migration induced by our 
intervention increases food and non-food expenditures of migrants’ family members remaining at 
the origin by 30-35%, and improves their caloric intake by 550-700 calories per person per day.  On 
an initial investment of about $6-$8 (the average round-trip cost to a destination), migrants earn 
$110 on average during the lean season and save about half of that, suggestive of a very high rate of 
return on investment.  Most strikingly, households in the treatment areas continue to migrate at a 
higher rate even after the incentive is removed.  The migration rate is 10 percentage points higher in 
treatment areas a year later, and this figure drops only slightly to 8 percentage points 3 years later. 
Our results add to an emerging literature that documents very high rates of return to small 
capital investments in developing countries (Udry & Anagol, 2006; de Mel et al., 2008; Bandiera et 
al., 2011; Duflo et al., 2011; Fafchamps et al., 2011). They also help to explain the persistent 
productivity gap between rural agriculture and urban non-agriculture sectors (D. Gollin et al., 2002; 
Caselli, 2005; Restuccia et al., 2008; Vollrath, 2009; McMillan & Rodrik, 2011) and the frictions that 
keep workers in agriculture despite the low relative productivity (Gollin, Lagakos and Waugh 2011).  
Finally, our results bolster the case made by Clemens et al (2008), Rosenzweig (2006), Gibson and 
McKenzie (2010), Clemens (2011), Rodrik (2007) and Hanson (2009) that offering migration 
opportunities has large effects on welfare, even relative to other promising development 
interventions in health, education, trade or agriculture.  The prior literature largely focuses on 
                                                 
2 Prior attempts use controls for observables (Adams, 1998), selection correction methods (Barham & Boucher, 1998; Acosta et al., 
2007), matching methods (Gibson & McKenzie, 2010), instrumental variables methods (Brown & Leeves, 2007; McKenzie & 
Rapoport, 2007; Yang, 2008; Macours & Vakis, 2010; BenYishay, forthcoming) and natural policy experiments (Clemens, 2010; 
Gibson et al., forthcoming) to answer this question. 
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international migration, and we show that the returns to internal migration – a much more common, 
but under-studied phenomenon3 – are also large.   
The large consumption effects and preference for migration revealed by the re-migration beg 
one very important question: Why didn’t our subjects already engage in such highly profitable 
behavior?  This puzzle is not limited to our sample: according to nationally representative HIES 
2005 data only 5 percent of households in Monga-prone districts receive domestic remittances, while 
22 percent of all Bangladeshi households do. Remittances under-predict out-migration rates, but the 
size and direction of this gap is puzzling.  The behavior also mirrors broader trends in international 
migration.  The poorest Europeans from the poorest regions were the ones who chose not to 
migrate during a period in which 60 million Europeans left for the New World, even though their 
returns from doing so was likely the highest (Hatton & Williamson, 1998).  Ardington et al (2009) 
provides similar evidence of constraints preventing profitable out-migration in rural South Africa.  
The set of facts we document can be explained by a model in which experimenting with a 
new activity is risky, and rational households choose not migrate in the face of uncertainty about 
their prospects at the destination, even though they expect positive returns.  Given a potential 
downside to migration (which we show exists in our data), households fear an unlikely but disastrous 
outcome, in which they pay the cost of moving but return hungry after not finding employment 
during a period when their family is already under the threat of famine.  Inducing the inaugural 
migration by insuring against this devastating outcome (which our grant or loan with implied limited 
liability managed to do) can lead to long-run benefits where households either learn how well their 
skills fare at the destination, or improve future prospects by allowing employers to learn about them.   
                                                 
3 There were 240 times as many internal migrants in China in 2001 as there were international migrants (Ping, 2003), and 4.3 million 
people migrated internally in the 5 years leading up to the 1999 Vietnam census compared to only 300,000 international migrants 
(Anh, 2003).   
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Three key elements of this model - (a) a risky technology, (b) the potential for individual-
specific learning about the technology, and (c) that individuals are close to subsistence for whom the 
downside risk is disastrous – explain the high take-up rate for the intervention, the positive 
consumption effects, and the voluntary re-migration in a future period.  The theory suggests that we 
can expect similar large ongoing impacts from small interventions in situations where these elements 
are present.  This provides insight on a number of other important puzzles in growth and 
development.  For example, green revolution technologies led to dramatic increases in agricultural 
productivity in South Asia (Evenson & Gollin, 2003), but adoption and diffusion of the new 
technologies was surprisingly slow, partly due to low levels of experimentation and the resultant 
slow learning (Munshi, 2004).  Smallholder farmers reliant on the grain output for subsistence may 
not find it in their interest to experiment with a new technology with uncertain returns (given the 
farmer’s own soil quality, rainfall and farming techniques), even if they believe the technology is very 
likely to be profitable.4  Aversion to experimentation can also hinder entrepreneurship and business 
start-ups and growth (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Fischer, 2009).   
Our theory takes the view that the poor are not able to take advantage of a profitable 
opportunity because they are “vulnerable” and afraid of losses (Banerjee, 2004).  This is closely 
related to the conceptualization of poverty in several other models (Kanbur, 1979; Kihlstrom & 
Laffont, 1979; Banerjee & Newman, 1991).  The Monga setting therefore provides an opportunity to 
test the “poverty as vulnerability” theory, and we return to our data and conduct a new round of 
experiments to test five new implications that are drawn from our model.   
First, households that are close to subsistence – on whom experimenting with a new activity 
imposes the biggest risk – should start with lower migration rates, but should be the most responsive 
                                                 
4 The inability to experiment due to uninsured risk has been linked to biases towards low risk low-return technologies that stunt 
long-run growth (Yesuf et al., 2009), and to reduced investments in agricultural inputs and technologies such as new high-yield 
variety seeds and fertilizer (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011). 
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to our intervention.  Second, the incentive should have a larger effect on households that do not 
have network connections at the destination, because they have more to learn about the destination.  
Third, households should exhibit learning about migration opportunities and destinations in their 
subsequent choices on whether and where to re-migrate.  Specifically, households with successful 
outcomes should be more likely to re-migrate, especially to the destinations where we originally 
induced them to migrate.  Fourth, because fear of the disastrous negative outcome is the key 
aversion preventing migration, offering a limited liability loan to migrate should have a similar effect 
on migration rates as a conditional grant.  Fifth, migration should be more responsive to incentives 
(e.g. credit conditional on migration) than to unconditional credit, because the latter also improves the 
returns to staying at home.5  We find support for all of these predictions using our data and a new 
round of treatments. 
Although we do conduct a new round of experiments to test two of the model’s 
implications, many of these other results are identified through heterogeneity in treatment effects, 
and are therefore not experimental.  There are legitimate omitted variables concerns with the risk-
aversion interpretation we provide of the observation that households that are close to subsistence 
are more responsive to our incentive. That result could be driven by other characteristics correlated 
with low income, such as behavioral attributes that make certain households liquidity constrained on 
a regular basis (Banerjee & Mullainathan, 2010; Duflo et al., 2011).  Our claim is not that there are 
no other possible explanations for our findings, but rather that, taken as a whole, the results are 
consistent with, and highly suggestive of, the model we propose.    Furthermore, some of the other 
supporting evidence we present is based on experimental variation.  For example, as part of our 
incentive scheme we required a subset of households to migrate to a specific destination.  This 
treatment provides exogenous variation in destination choice and we show that being induced to 
                                                 
5 One might think that this is a simple rationality requirement, but it is not implied by a model in which households fail to migrate 
because they are liquidity constrained.   
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migrate to a specific destination in the first round significantly predicts second round destination 
choice.  We interpret this as evidence of location-specific learning or creation of location specific 
capital, which is a key assumption of our model. 
Results of these tests notwithstanding, it is still somewhat puzzling that the households we 
induced were not experimenting with migration in years in which their income realization was high, 
or that they did not save up to experiment.  Our neo-classical explanation may not be a fully 
satisfying explanation for this phenomenon (as argued by Duflo et al (2011) to explain low fertilizer 
use in Kenya). In the penultimate section of this paper we discuss some additional explanations 
drawing on the literature on behavioral economics. Our view is that our experiment demonstrates 
that the ingredients of subsistence, risk aversion and learning that we outline in our model are 
essential parts of any story - very few behavioral stories could explain our results if migration were 
not risky, households were far from subsistence and there was nothing to learn.   
Our analysis provides a possible explanation for surprisingly low adoption rates of 
efficacious technologies with the potential to address important development challenges.  Studies 
have shown that adoption rates for a range of technologies from tropical diseases treatment, 
agricultural productivity improvements, and savings products have remained low (Kremer et al., 
2009; Dupas & Robinson, 2011; Meredith et al., 2011; G. Miller & Mobarak, 2011).  If adoption is 
risky (e.g. due to risk of crop failure, or uncertainty about durability of an expensive new stove or 
water purifying technology) then giving households the opportunity to experiment with the new 
technology by insuring against failure may be an effective marketing strategy (Dupas, 2010).  Our 
experiments are also related to the recent literature on the effects of unconditional and conditional 
cash transfers on developing country households (Gertler, 2004; Schultz, 2004; Rawlings & Rubio, 
2005; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Paxson, 2010; Baird et al., forthcoming).  Our findings suggest that 
providing credit to enable households to search for jobs, and to aid spatial and seasonal matching 
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between people and jobs, may be a useful way to augment the microcredit concept currently more 
narrowly focused on creating new entrepreneurs and new businesses. 
Finally, from a narrow policy perspective, the program we implement appears to be a cost-
effective response to the widespread famines that afflict the 5.3 million people residing in the 
Rangpur region of Bangladesh with disturbing regularity.  Such predictable pre-harvest hungry 
seasons are also widespread in sub-Saharan Africa.  The solution we implement is inexpensive; it 
confers long-run benefits even when offered as a once off; and is therefore more sustainable than 
subsidizing food purchases.  Two important caveats are that our research does not capture long-
term psychological and social effects of migration, and we do not study general equilibrium effects.  
Consideration of general equilibrium effects may not over-turn these findings however, since 
spillover benefits at the origin (which are found to be substantial in de Brauw and Giles (2008)’s 
research on migration from rural China) may exceed external costs at the destination.  This is 
because emigrants form a much larger part of the village economy at the origin compared to the 
destination urban economy.      
The next two sections describe the context and the design of our interventions. We present 
results on program take-up and the effects of migration in Section 4. These findings motivate the 
risky experimentation model in Section 5. We present statistical tests of various implications of the 
model in Section 6, discuss alternative explanations of the data in Section 7 and offer conclusions 
and policy advice in Section 8. 
2. The Context: Northwestern Bangladesh and the Monga Famine 
 
Our experiments were conducted in 100 villages in two districts (Kurigram and Lalmonirhat) 
in the seasonal-famine prone Rangpur region of north-western Bangladesh. The Rangpur region is 
home to roughly 7% of the country’s population, or 9.6 million people.  57% of the region’s 
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population (or 5.3 million people) live below the poverty line.6  In addition to the level of poverty, 
the Rangpur region experiences more pronounced seasonality in income and consumption, with 
incomes decreasing by 50-60% and total household expenditures dropping by 10-25% during the 
post-planting and pre-harvest season (September-November) for the main Aman rice crop 
(Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming).  As Figure 1 indicates, the price of rice also spikes during this 
season, particularly in Rangpur, and thus actual rice consumption drops 22% even as households 
shift monetary expenditures towards food while waiting for the Aman rice harvest. 
The lack of job opportunities and low wages during the pre-harvest season and the 
coincident increase in grain prices combines to create a situation of seasonal deprivation and famine 
(Sen, 1981; Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming).7  The famine occurs with disturbing regularity and 
thus has a name: Monga. It has been described as a routine crisis (Rahman, 1995), and its effects on 
hunger and starvation are widely chronicled in the local media. Agricultural wages in the Rangpur 
region are already among the lowest in the country over the entire year (BBS Monthly Statistical 
Bulletins), and further, demand for agricultural labor plunges between planting and harvest. The 
resultant drastic drop in purchasing power for Rangpur households reliant on agricultural wage 
employment threatens to take consumption below subsistence. 
Several puzzling stylized facts about household and institutional characteristics and coping 
strategies motivate the design of our migration experiments. First, seasonal out-migration from the 
monga-prone districts appears to be low despite the absence of local non-farm employment 
opportunities. According to the nationally representative HIES 2005 data, it is more common for 
agricultural laborers from other regions of Bangladesh to migrate in search of higher wages and 
                                                 
6 Extreme poverty rates (defined as individuals who cannot meet the 2100 calorie per day food intake even if they spend their entire 
incomes on food purchases only) were 25 percent nationwide, but 43 percent in the Rangpur districts. Poverty figures are based on 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) Household Income and expenditure survey 2005 (HIES 2005), and population figures are 
based on projections from the 2001 Census data. 
7 Amartya Sen (1981)notes these price spikes and wage plunges as important causes of the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, and that the 
greater Rangpur districts were among the most severely affected by this famine. 
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employment opportunities, and this is known to be one primary mechanism by which households 
diversify income sources in India (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). 
Second, inter-regional variation in income and poverty between Rangpur and the rest of the 
Bangladesh have been shown to be much larger than the inter-seasonal variation within Rangpur 
(Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming). This suggests smoothing strategies that take advantage of 
inter-regional arbitrage opportunities (i.e. migration) rather than inter-seasonal variation (e.g. savings, 
credit) may hold greater promise. Moreover, an in-depth case-study of the Monga phenomenon 
(Zug, 2006) explicitly notes that there are off-farm employment opportunities in rickshaw-pulling 
and construction in nearby urban areas during the monga season. To be sure, Zug (2006) points out 
that this is a risky proposition for many, as labor demand and wages drop all over rice-growing 
Bangladesh during that season. However, this seasonality is less pronounced than that observed in 
Rangpur (Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming). 
Finally, both government and large NGO monga-mitigation efforts have concentrated on 
direct subsidy programs like free or highly-subsidized grain distribution (e.g. “Vulnerable Group 
Feeding,”), or food-for-work and targeted microcredit programs. These programs are expensive, and 
the stringent micro-credit repayment schedule may itself keep households from engaging in 
profitable migration (Shonchoy, 2010). There are structural reasons associated with rice production 
seasonality for the seasonal unemployment in Rangpur, and thus encouraging seasonal migration 
towards where jobs are appears to be a sensible complementary policy to experiment with. 
3. Design of Interventions and Experiment 
 
The two districts where the project is conducted (Lalmonirhat and Kurigram) represent the 
agro-ecological zones that regularly witness the monga famine. We randomly selected 100 villages in 
these two districts and first conducted a village census in each location in June 2008. Next we 
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randomly selected 19 households in each village from the set of households that reported (a) that 
they owned less than 50 decimals of land, and (b) that a household member was forced to miss 
meals during the prior (2007) monga season.8  We conducted a baseline survey of these 1900 
households during the pre-monga season in July 2008.  Our analysis will draw on additional rounds 
of follow-up surveys conducted in December 2008, May 2009, December 2009 and July 2011. 
In August 2008 we randomly allocated the 100 villages into four groups: Cash, Credit, 
Information and Control. These treatments were subsequently implemented in collaboration with 
PKSF 9 through their partner NGOs with substantial field presence in the two districts.  The partner 
NGOs were already implementing micro-credit programs in each of the 100 sample villages. 
The NGOs implemented the interventions in late August 2008 for the Monga season 
starting in September. 16 of the 100 study villages (consisting of 304 sample households) were 
randomly assigned to form a control group. A further 16 villages (consisting of another 304 sample 
households) were placed in a job information only treatment. These households were given 
information on types of jobs available in four pre-selected destinations, the likelihood of getting 
such a job and approximate wages associated with each type of job and destination (see Appendix 1 
for details). 703 households in 37 randomly selected villages were offered cash of 600 Taka 
(~US$8.50) at the origin conditional on migration, and an additional bonus of 200 Taka (~US$3) if 
the migrant reported to us at the destination during a specified time period.  We also provided 
exactly the same information about jobs and wages to this group as in the information-only 
treatment. 600 Taka covers a little more than the average round-trip cost of safe travel from the two 
origin districts to the four nearby towns for which we provided job information.  We monitored 
                                                 
8 71% of the census households owned less than 50 decimals of land, and 63% responded affirmatively to the question about missing 
meals. Overall, 56% satisfied both criteria, and our sample is therefore representative of the poorer 56% of the rural population in 
the two districts. 
9 PKSF (Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation) is an apex micro-credit funding and capacity building organizations in 




migration behavior carefully and strictly imposed the migration conditionality, so that the 600 Taka 
intervention was practically equivalent to providing a bus ticket.10  
The 589 households in the final set of 31 villages were offered the same information and the 
same Tk 600 + Tk 200 incentive to migrate, but in the form of a zero-interest loan to be paid back 
at the end of the monga season.  The loan was offered by our partner micro-credit NGOs that have 
a history of lending money in these villages.  There is an implicit understanding of limited liability on 
these loans since we are lending to the extremely poor during a period of financial hardship. As 
discussed below, ultimately 80% of households were able to repay the loan. 
Table 1 shows that there was pre-treatment balance across the randomly assigned groups in 
terms of the variables that we will use as outcomes in the analysis to follow.  A Bonferroni multiple 
comparison correction for 27 independent tests requires a significance threshold of α=0.0019 for 
each test to recover an overall significance level of α=0.05.  Using this criterion, no differences at 
baseline are statistically meaningful. 
In the 68 villages where we provided monetary incentives for people to seasonally out-
migrate (37 cash + 31 credit villages), we sometimes randomly assigned additional conditionalities to 
subsets of households within the village.  A trial profile in Figure 2 provides details.  Some 
households were required to migrate in groups, and some were required to migrate to a specific 
destination. We will not directly analyze the effects of such conditionalities in this paper, but these 
conditionalities created random within-village variation, which make it possible to study spillover 
and learning effects from one person to another using instrumental variables.  
                                                 
10 The strict imposition of the migration conditionality implied that some households had to return the 600 Taka if they did not 
migrate after accepting the cash. We could not provide an actual bus ticket (rather than cash to buy it) for practical reasons: if that 
specific bus crashed, then that would have reflected poorly on the NGOs.  Our data show that households found cheaper ways to 
travel to the destination: the average roundtrip travel cost was reported to be 450 Taka. The 150 Taka saving can cover about 5 days 
of food expenditure for one person at the origin.   
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4. Program Take-up and the Effects of Seasonal Migration 
 
In this section we report results on take-up of the treatment, the effects of seasonal 
migration on household consumption at the origin, and on income and savings of the migrant at the 
destination, and the propensity to re-migrate in 2009 and in 2011 after incentives are removed.  
4.1 Migration and Re-migration 
Table 2 reports the take-up of the program across the four groups labeled cash, credit, 
information and control.  We have 2008 migration data from two follow-up surveys, one conducted 
immediately after the monga ended (in December 2008), and another in May 2009.  The second 
follow-up was helpful for cross-checking the first migration report11, and for capturing the migration 
experiences of those who left and/or returned later. The two sets of reports were highly consistent 
with each other, and Table 1 shows the more complete migration rates obtained in May 2009.   
In Table 2 we define a household as having a seasonal migrant if at least one household 
member migrated away in search of work between September 2008 and April 2009. This extended 
definition of the migration window accounts for the possibility that our incentive merely moved 
forward migration that would have taken place anyway.  This window captures all migration during 
the Aman cropping season and, as a consequence, all the migration associated with Monga.    
About a third (35.9%) of households in control villages sent a seasonal migrant.  Providing 
households information about wages and job opportunities at the destination had no effect on the 
migration rate (the difference in point estimate is 0.0% and is quite tightly estimated).  Either 
households already had the information that we made available to them, or the information we made 
available was not useful or credible.  With the $8.50 (+$3) cash or credit treatments, the seasonal 
                                                 
11 Since an incentive was involved, we verified migration reports closely using the substantial field presence of our partner NGOs, 
by cross-checking migration dates in the two surveys conducted six months apart, by cross-checking responses across households 
who reported migrating together in a group, and finally, by independently asking neighbors.  The analysis (available on request) 
shows a high degree of accuracy in the cross reports and, importantly, that the accuracy of the cross reporting was not different in 
incentivized villages.    
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migration rate jumps to 59.0% and 56.8% respectively.  In other words, incentives induced about 
22% of the sample households to send a migrant.12   The migration response to the cash and credit 
incentives are statistically significant relative to control or information, but there is no statistical 
difference between providing cash and providing credit.13  Since households appear to react very 
similarly to either incentive, we combine the impact of these two treatments for expositional 
simplicity (and call it “incentive”) for much of our analysis, and compare it against the combined 
information and control groups (labeled “non-incentive”). 
The lower panel of table 2 compares re-migration rates in subsequent years across the 
incentive and non-incentive groups.  We conducted follow-up surveys in December 2009 and in July 
2011 and asked about migration behavior in the preceding lean seasons, but we did not repeat any of 
the treatments in the villages used for the comparisons in the top half of table 2.  Strikingly, the 
migration rate in 2009 was 10 percentage points higher in treatment villages, and this is after the 
incentives were removed.  Regressions of the re-migration choice (discussed in detail in section 6) 
shows that if a particular household was induced to migrate in 2008, that roughly doubles the chance 
(a 45 percentage point effect) that it will send a migrant again in 2009.  The July 2011 survey focused 
on migration during the other (lesser) lean season that coincides with the pre-harvest period for the 
second (lesser) rice harvest. Even two and a half years later, without any further program or 
incentive, the migration rate remains 8% higher in the villages randomly assigned to the cash or 
credit treatment in 2008.   
We learn two important things from this re-migration behavior.  First, the propensity to re-
migrate absent further inducements serves as a revealed preference based indication that the net 
benefits from migration were positive for many, and/or that migrants developed some asset during 
                                                 
12 The migrant is almost always male (97%), and often the household head (84% in treatment villages and 76% in control), who is the 
only migrant from that household (93%).  Migrants make 1.73 trips on average during the season, which implies that migrants often 
travel multiple times within the season.  The first trip lasts 42 (56) days for treatment (control) group migrants. They return home 
with remittance and to rest, and travel again for 40 (40) days or less on any subsequent trips. 
13 Our model will later provide an explanation for this fact. 
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the initial experience that makes future migration a positive expected return activity.14  Second, the 
persistence of re-migration from 2009 to 2011 (without much further decay after the four potential 
migration seasons in between) suggests that households learnt something valuable or grew some real 
asset from the initial migration experience.  This persistence makes it unlikely that some households 
simply got lucky one year, and then it took them several tries to determine (again) that they are 
actually better off not migrating.  It also reduces the likelihood that our results are driven by a 
particularly good migration year in 2008. 
78% of all 2011 migrants provided incentives in 2008 report going back to work for the 
same employer, which further bolsters our interpretation that the migrants who were induced gained 
something real and valuable: a connection to an employer.   A likely source of uncertainty in the 
returns to migration thus appears to be the (potential) employer’s incomplete information about the 
characteristics of specific migrants – are they reliable, honest, hard-working?  This would make it 
difficult for migrants to “learn” from other villagers to resolve the uncertainty, and could explain the 
null effect of our information treatment.  The fact that learning seems to be individual-specific also 
provides a possible explanation for the fact that some but not all village members migrate.  If 
villagers could learn from the group we would expect to see complete learning overtime driven by 
the experiences of early adopters (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995). 
 We also find that migrants in the incentive treatments (provided cash or credit in 2008) who 
continue working for the same employer in 2011 are significantly more likely to have formed a 
connection to that specific employer in 2008, when they were originally induced to go.  Specifically, 
treatment group migrants are 20% more likely to report forming the job connection to their current 
                                                 
14 While we will examine the effect of migration on specific economic outcomes measured in the survey, any one of those outcomes 
will necessarily be incomplete, since it is not possible to combine the social, psychological and economic effects of migration in one 
comprehensive welfare measure.  The revealed re-migration preference is therefore a useful complement to other economic 
outcomes that we use in the analysis below. 
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(2011) employer in 2008 instead of 2007, relative to “regular” migrants in the control group.15  This 
is again strongly suggestive that the migrants who were induced to migrate by our treatments formed 
an asset (a connection to an employer) at the destination, which continued to provide value three 
years later. 
4.2 Effects of Migration on Consumption at the Origin 
 
We now study the effects of migration on consumption expenditures amongst remaining 
household members during the monga season. Consumption is a broad and useful measure of the 
benefits of migration, aggregating as it does the impact of migrating on the whole family (Deaton, 
1997), and takes into account the monetary costs of investing (although it neglects non-pecuniary 
costs).  Consumption can be comparably measured for migrant and non-migrant families alike, and 
it helps overcome the problems associated with measuring the full costs and benefits of technology 
adoption that are highlighted in Foster and Rosenzweig (2010).  Our consumption data are detailed 
and comprehensive: we collect expenditures on 318 different food (255) and non-food (63) items 
(mostly over a week recall, and some less-frequently-purchased items over bi-weekly or monthly 
recall), and aggregate up to create measures of food and non-food expenditures and caloric intake.   
The effects on expenditures are calculated from a regression where the choice to migrate is 
instrumented with whether or not a household was randomly placed in the incentive group.   In 
particular we estimate the equation: 
	Yivj=α+ β Migrantivj + θ	Xivj + φj + υivj 
where Yij is per capita consumption expenditure for household i in village v in sub-district j in 2008; 
Migrantivj  is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one member of household migrated during Monga 
                                                 
15  The estimating equation is: ܫ݊ݐݎ݋݀ݑܿ݁݀௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ 	ߚܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݅ݖ݁݀௜,ଶ଴଴଼	 ൅ ߝ௜௧,	 where ܫ݊ݐݎ݋݀ݑܿ݁݀௜௧ is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
introduced to the employer in 2008 and equal to 0 if introduced in 2007; ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݅ݖ݁݀௜,ଶ଴଴଼	is a binary variable equal to 1 if randomly 
assigned to receive cash or credit in 2008 and 0 otherwise.  P-value for the “sharp” difference test (2008 introduction rather than 
2007): 0.09. P-value for the difference test (2008 or 2009 introduction rather than 2007/2006): 0.06. P-value for the difference-in-
differences test (2008 vs. 2007, treatment relative to control): 0.26. 
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in 2008 and 0 otherwise; Xivj is a vector of baseline-level controls for household characteristics, 
including households income and proxy for assets,	φj are fixed effects for sub-districts, and υij is a 
mean-zero error term.  Migrant is likely an endogenous variable, and we produce consistent estimates 
of ߚ by instrumenting with the experimental treatments.  The first stage equation is: 
Migrantivj = λ+ ρ Zv+ߛ Xivj +φj+εivj	 
where the set of instruments Zv	 includes indicators for the random assignment at the village level 
into one of the treatment (cash or credit) or control groups.  As is well known, estimates produced 
in this way show the effect of migration on those households that were induced to migrate by our 
intervention (that is the local average treatment effect or LATE).  In our context this is the most 
policy relevant parameter: it is the consumption impact of migration on those that are induced to 
migrate by a policy that incentivizes migration.  The LATE is also the average effect of migration on 
consumption for a well-defined subset of the population. 
First stage results in table 3 verify that the random assignments to cash or credit treatments 
are powerful predictors of the decision to migrate.  The second-stage estimates in table 4 show that 
migration of a household member during the monga season has substantial impact on the remaining 
household members’ well-being.  In all cases the left hand side variables are household level averages 
using the set of people reported to be living in the household at the time of the survey as the 
denominator.  We discuss the appropriate choice of denominator in more detail below. 
 IV estimates using treatment assignment are always larger than OLS estimates.  This likely 
reflects the fact that rich households at the upper end of our sample income distribution are not 
very likely to migrate (as we will show in section 6) in our analysis of heterogeneity of take-up).  In 
the IV specification, per capita food, non-food expenditures, and caloric intake among induced 
migrant households increase by 30% to 35% relative to non-migrant households.    We also observe 
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some changes towards higher quality diets as food consumption shifts towards protein, and more 
specifically towards meat and fish, which are more attractive, “tasty” sources of protein in the 
Bangladesh context.  Among non-food items, we observe increases in child education expenditures 
among migrant households. There is also an increase in expenditures on clothing and shoes, but that 
is likely an effect of migrants bringing back gifts for their family members.  
In terms of magnitude of effects, monthly consumption expenditures among migrant 
families increase by about $5 per person, or $20 per household due to induced migration.   Our 
survey only asked about expenditures during the second month of monga, and the modal migrant in 
our sample had not yet returned from their current migration episode (which includes cases where 
they may have returned once, but left again).  We therefore expect the effects to persist for at least 
another month, and the total expenditure increase therefore easily exceeds the amount of the 
treatment ($8.50).   Furthermore, if households engage in consumption smoothing, then some 
benefits may persist even further in the future.  In any case, the $8.50 is spent two months prior on 
transportation costs. 
Since the act of migration increases both the independent variable of interest and possibly 
reduces the denominator of the dependent variable (household size at the time of interview), any 
measurement error in the date that migrants report returning can bias the coefficient on migration 
upwards. We address this problem directly by studying the effects of migration in 2008 on 
consumption in 2009 (where household size is computed using a totally different survey conducted 
over a year later).  The last column of table 4 shows that 2009 effects are about 60-75% as large as 
the consumption effects in 2008, but still statistically significant.  Migration is associated with a 26% 
increase in household expenditure which is still substantial.  These long-run consumption gains are 
not necessarily from migrants consuming their 2008 earnings over a long period, but because many 
of those induced to migrate in 2008 were induced to re-migrate a year later. 
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Since the migration decision is serially correlated, measurement error in 2009 migration dates 
can also bias our estimates. We therefore conduct a number of other sensitivity checks on the 
consumption results by varying the definition of household size (the denominator).  We 
conservatively assume that household members present in the house on the day of the interview 
were present for the entire prior month to consume the reported expenditures, since this variable is 
least likely to suffer from measurement error and coding problems.  The consumption effects in this 
specification are about 75-80% as large (e.g. 550 calories per person rather than 713), and statistically 
significant.  The effects are similar when we estimate household size based on an entirely different 
question in the survey (“who currently lives in the household” as opposed to “who is present on the 
interview date”).  Finally, even if we assume that migrants never left and use household size 
constructed from baseline data, migration is estimated to increase consumption by 250 calories per 
person per day. 
We can also consider the impact of migration in 2009 on consumption in 2009.  Since 2008 
treatments do not predict 2009 migration as strongly (first-stage F-stat <5), we have a weak 
instrument problem, and do not emphasize these results.  Nevertheless, we find that migration in 
2009 increases per-capita expenditures by a statistically significant 775 Taka in 2009 (compared to 
the 355 Taka effect observed in 2008).  The larger effect is related to the fact that a select group of 
“successful” migrants from 2008 were the ones who chose to re-migrate in 2009 (as we show in 
section 6), and the effects among compliers in the 2009 IV regression are therefore larger.   
4.3 Income and Savings at the Destination 
Next we examine the data on migrants’ earnings and savings at the destination to see 
whether the magnitude of consumption gains we observe at the origin are in line with the amount 
migrants earn, save and remit.  Table 5 shows that migrants earn about $110 (7777 Taka) on average 
and save about half of that.  The average savings plus remittance is about a dollar a day.  Remitting 
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money is difficult and migrants carry money back in person, which is partly why we observe multiple 
migration episodes during the same lean season.  Therefore, joint savings plus remittances is the best 
available indicator of money available for consumption at the origin.  The destination data suggest 
that this amount is about $66 (4600 Taka).  
The “regular” migrants in the control group earn more per episode, save and remit more per 
day relative to migrants in the treatment group.  This is understandable, since the migrants we 
induce are new and relatively inexperienced in this activity.  Even though the induced migrants had 
lower earning potential, they earned $105 on average and saved and remitted more than half of that, 
which suggests a very high rate of return on the $8.50 incentive.  
Table 6 breaks down the number of migration episodes and average earnings by sector and 
by destination.  Dhaka (the largest urban area) is the most popular migration destination, and a large 
fraction of migrants to Dhaka work in the transport sector (i.e. rickshaw pulling).  Many others work 
for a daily wage, often as unskilled labor at construction sites.  At or around other smaller towns that 
are nearer to Rangpur, many migrants work in agriculture, especially in potato-growing areas that 
follow a different seasonal crop cycle than in rice-growing Rangpur.  Migrants earn the most in 
Dhaka and at other “non-agricultural destinations”: about 5100 Taka or $71 per migration episode, 
which translates to $121 per household on average given multiple trips.  Those working for daily 
wages in the non-agricultural sector (e.g. construction sites, brick kilns) earn the most.     
It is difficult to infer the income these migrants would have received had they not migrated, 
since we do not have comparable measures of wages and earnings for non-migrants (who engage in 
a variety of agricultural, self-employment and entrepreneurial tasks at the origin).  Observed migrant 
earnings at the destination (100 Taka per day on average) do compare favorably to the earnings of 
the sub-sample of non-migrants with salaried employment at the origin (65 Taka per day) and to the 
profits of small-business entrepreneurs at the origin (61 Taka per day).  This comparison is on the 
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basis of a selected sample of migrants and non-migrants with employment, but it is informative 
about the source from which the extra consumption among migrant households is derived.   
While all our data suggest that the extra consumption at the origin is primarily related to 
migrant earnings, savings and remittance, it is possible that some intensive margin effects (e.g. a 
switch towards protein or child expenditures) are realized because the husband is away, and there are 
intra-household gender differences in spending priorities (Thomas, 1994; Duflo, 2003; G. Miller, 
2008).  However, the intra-household mechanism is unlikely to explain the overall consumption gain 
(aggregating across food and non-food expenditures). Another possibility is that the overall caloric 
requirement increases because the migrant works harder, but that also does not directly explain the 
consumption gain among household members remaining at the origin.   
4.4 Is Migration Risky? 
Although migration was profitable on average, and a seemingly sensible strategy for most, 
there is heterogeneity in the returns to migration.  Figure 3 shows that 16% of control group 
migrants and 27% of migrants from treatment areas earn less than the average earnings for a salaried 
position at the origin (65 Taka per day). This is admittedly a high bar, since many of the migrants we 
induced likely would not have been able to secure a steady salaried position at the origin.  We asked 
migrants about their expectations and their actual earnings, and 11% report earning less than they 
expected.  About 80% of households who took a loan to migrate were able to re-pay (there was 
implicit limited liability on a micro-credit NGOs loan given during a famine). While we cannot 
accurately measure risk in other (non-economic) dimensions associated with how unpleasant it is for 
the migrant to stay away from family, the revealed preference (re-migration) data indicates that about 
half the people induced to migrate the first year choose not to return. 
We can examine heterogeneity in the effect of migration on consumption by running “intent 
to treat” quantile regressions that regresses total expenditures on the cash/credit treatment 
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assignment at different parts of the distribution.  This regression shows that the 10th percentile 
household in treatment villages experience only a statistically insignificant 14 Taka increase in 
expenditures per person, whereas the effect in the top half of the distribution is around 75-115 Taka.  
The quantile regressions suggest that migration is not valuable for about 10-20% of the population.        
 In addition to the uncertain returns from migration, the size of the initial investment is not 
trivial.  The travel cost (and the inducement we provided) is equivalent to about 10 days of salaried 
employment at the origin.  The inducement would cover about 25 days of food expenditure for one 
person during the famine season.  Almost always the adult male who is the primary wage earner for 
the family migrates, and women typically do not work outside the home.  In summary, the data 
suggest that households take a non-trivial risk to travel, and there is about a 10-20% risk of “failure”.  
 
5. A Model of Risky Experimentation 
 
In this section we develop a simple model that is inspired by the three key facts we 
documented above: (1) A large number of households were motivated to migrate in response to the 
600 Taka incentive, (2) There were positive returns to migration on average, indicating that 
households were not migrating despite a positive expected profit, and (3) A large portion of the 
households that were incentivized to migrate in year one continued to send a seasonal migrant in 
year two (and again in year 4) and continued to earn a high return to this activity.    
Our model is specifically designed to capture the fact that the 600 Taka incentive had a large 
effect on the migration rate, but is not large in comparison to yearly income variation, nor total 
income.  In particular, the average change in weekly consumption is 307 Taka between rounds 1 and 
2 of our survey and 358 Taka between rounds 2 and 3.   The standard deviations of these numbers 
are 635 and 508 Taka respectively.  These figures suggest that variation in yearly income dwarfs the 
size of our 600 Taka payment, a point made forcefully by the observation that weekly expenditures 
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would need to drop just 11 Taka from a base of 860 Taka to save for the bus ticket.  Given these 
observations the challenge for the theory is to explain why 600 Taka can have such an effect on 
peoples’ choices. 
We propose a simple model that is a stripped down version of the classic poverty trap 
models of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Banerjee and Newman (1991), and argue that it can 
explain the three main program evaluation findings.  We then use the model to determine additional 
predictions that should hold in the data.  In section 7 we discuss alternative theories that can also 
generate similar facts and argue that our interpretation is to be preferred on several dimensions. 
Consider a household that lives for an infinite number of periods and in each period decides 
between staying at home and earning a certain income of y and sending a migrant and earning an 
income of y + b with probability μ(b) and y + g with probability μ (g). We assume that g > b and we 
also assume that after one migration episode the household becomes informed about whether the 
return is g or b. The best way to interpret the return in this context is that successful migration (g) 
requires connections at the destination. Before the first migration episode the household is unsure 
whether it will be able to find a connection, but once the connection is in place it is permanent.   
We assume that the household is a discounted expected utility maximizer with utility 
function u (that obeys all the usual assumptions), discount factor δ and that b and g are such that: 
u(y + g) > u(y); and 
u(y + b) < u(y). 
Given these assumptions, the return to migrating is 
Vm	=	 μሺgሻuሺy+gሻ+μሺbሻ൫ሺ1-δሻuሺy+bሻ+δuሺyሻ൯
1-δ  





Figure 4 shows a typical plot of Vm and Vh as a function of baseline income y. While the two curves 
need not cross, if they do it is usually true that they cross only once with Vm being optimal above 
some threshold income y*.16  It is much more likely that the curves will cross like this if the outcome 
b is sufficiently bad so that u(y + b) is in the very steep part of the utility function.  Figure 4 is drawn 
under specific parametric assumptions.  In particular u is assumed to be the natural logarithm, and in 
that case the single crossing requires that y + b be close to 0, the point at which the derivative of the 
log utility function becomes infinite and the utility of consumption infinitely negative.  This is a 
reasonable interpretation of subsistence. 
When the conditions for a single crossing are met, the model generates a poverty trap. 
Households with income y < y* never migrate; they consume their initial income y forever.  
Households that have income of y ≥ y* migrate and learn their migration status.  If they are able to 
find a connection they earn y + g forever after and if they are not able to find a connection they 
return to consuming y. The long run distribution of income is therefore as depicted in Figure 5. 
Thus we have a very simple poverty trap, those with initial incomes below a certain level stagnate at 
that level while those with starting incomes above that point are able to take advantage of migration 
and push their long run income up by g.   
It is well known that this sort of poverty trap requires two things to occur, first, there is a 
non-convexity in the production technology and second there is a missing market, in that we have 
shut down borrowing.  We believe that both of these assumptions are reasonable in our setting.  
Migration is clearly a lumpy investment as there is a minimum cost of a bus ticket.  Further, despite 
the influx of micro-credit in this region in recent years, most microcredit organizations require the 
borrower to spend the money on an entrepreneurial endeavor rather than migration, and 
                                                 
16 The precise conditions for the single crossing can be found in (Banerjee, 2004).   Roughly, if y+b is low enough and u is unbounded 
below, Vm must lie below Vh  in some range.  Further, Vm will be above Vh   in some range so long as the expected value of migrating 
is positive, and u exhibits Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA) which implies that the impact of risk aversion becomes 
negligible at high incomes.  Given these conditions DARA is sufficient to ensure that Vm is steeper than Vh and for most common 
parametric assumptions about the slope of the two functions converge to the same as income grows implying single crossing. 
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furthermore, require borrowers to remain at the origin to meet the obligations of a frequent 
repayment schedule (Shonchoy, 2010; Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming).  We also provide direct 
evidence that households would like access to credit to migrate by showing that households took up 
our credit offer, and migrated in response. 
Of course, in reality incomes vary across years and those that are close in average income to 
the cutoff y* will eventually jump from the low-income equilibrium to the high-income equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, poverty trap models such as this one provide a role for policy in helping those 
households whose income is sufficiently low that it is unlikely that they will move between the 
equilibria. Further, if the return g is large enough, a policy that helps households make the transition 
can lead to a modest transformation in people’s lives. 
5.1 Predictions on the Effects of Different Types of Interventions 
 
We now analyze how external interventions can assist households in making the jump 
between equilibria. Figure 6 compares three policies.  The first panel shows the baseline income 
threshold y*, identified as the crossing point of the two curves.   The second panel shows the new 
crossing point after a one-off unconditional cash transfer.  The third panel shows the crossing point if 
households are given an incentive similar to our “cash” treatment (of the same size as the transfer in 
the second panel).  The fourth panel shows the impact of an “insurance” program that provides a 
transfer (again of the same size) only if the household migrates and realizes state b. This fourth panel 
considers a policy that is similar to a limited liability loan, which is akin to our “credit” treatment.  
The figure reveals two testable implications.  First, because the poverty trap is driven almost 
entirely by the possibility of a near subsistence outcome in state b, the limited liability credit 
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(insurance) treatment realizes most of the benefits of the incentive policy.17  The intuition is that if 
the poverty trap is driven by income being close to subsistence in the bad state, then removing the 
possibility of very low consumption removes the lion’s share of the barrier to migration.  
Mathematically, the point of intersection of the curves is determined by the implicit equation 
	u(y+b+x) = ሾ1-μ(b)δሿ u(y) - μ(g) u(y+g) 
with an insurance of size x, and   
u(y+b+x)	=	[1-μ(b)δ] u(y)	-	μ(g)	u(y+g+x) 
with an incentive of size x.  As discussed above, we require u(y+b) to be small for the poverty trap to 
exist and as a consequence, adding x to the left hand side of these equations has a large effect.  On 
the other hand, we do not require that u(y+g) be small, in fact it must be relatively large to 
compensate for the possible downside of outcome b and ensure a positive expected return.  As a 
consequence, we do not expect the right hand side of the second equation to be changed much by 
the addition of x.  The implication then is that the required change in y* should be similar for an 
insurance policy or a cash incentive.  Empirically, we would predict that our “cash” and “loan” 
treatments will have a similar size impact on the migration rate.  
Second, because the un-conditional transfer increases both Vm and Vh, it has a more limited 
impact on y* and migration than an incentive which only increases Vm.   This point is obvious, but is 
not true in a model in which liquidity constraints are the force that restricts migration.  This test is, 
therefore, an important one because a pure liquidity constraint is probably the most likely alternative 
explanation for the three facts documented earlier.   Under the parametric assumptions used to draw 
Figure 6, (log utility and specific assumptions about probabilities and investment returns as listed in 
the figure) an incentive has the same effect on encouraging migration as an unconditional transfer of 
                                                 
17 The insurance policy is also much more cost effective; the incentive must be paid with certainty, while the insurance only pays out 
with probability μ(b). To translate this into our practical setting, the loan was repaid in roughly 80% of cases and the total cost of the 
loan treatment (excluding operating costs) is therefore only 20% of the cost of the incentive treatment. 
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twice the size.18  Since year-to-year variation in income act like un-conditional transfers, this can 
explain why our migration incentive scheme induces some households to migrate even when they 
experience yearly fluctuations in income that exceed the $8.50 incentive.  
5.2 Predictions on Treatment Heterogeneity: ‘Vulnerability’ and Subsistence 
  
For what types of households do we expect the results above on transfers and incentives to 
hold?  The situation considered in Figure 6 has a particular feature: household income y* is very low.  
This implies that the transfer policy has a relatively large impact on Vh and therefore that the effect 
of the incentive is large relative to the effect of the transfer.  This is what is required if we are to 
match the empirical fact that our incentive has a large effect, but the size of the incentive is small 
relative to yearly variation in income.  If y* is high relative to subsistence then it will no longer be the 
case that an incentive has a large effect relative to a transfer. Figure 7 illustrates. The left panel 
shows how a transfer will affect the curves Vm and Vh, while the right panel illustrates the impact of 
an incentive. Because income (before considering the effect of the bad outcome) in this example is 
relatively far from the subsistence point (as illustrated by the fact that Vh is relatively flat) the 
transfer has only a small impact on Vh and as a result the incentive and transfer policies have a 
similar effect. In such a context it seems unlikely that our incentive would have much of an impact 
as it is small relative to yearly variation in income and therefore most of the households that are far 
from subsistence will already have moved to the high income equilibrium.  On the other hand, it is 
easy to see that if income is close to subsistence and Vh is accordingly steeper, then a transfer will 
have a much smaller impact on migration rates. This reasoning combined with the fact that the 
overall impact of our incentive on Vm will be largest when y* is small (due to concavity of the utility 
function) leads us to predict that our treatments will have a larger effect on those households that 
are close to subsistence. 
                                                 
18 This assumes that households are uniformly distributed with respect to income. 
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5.3 Predictions on Learning 
Our model is able to generate such a stark poverty trap because we assume that there is 
learning about the state of the world after one migration episode.   The program evaluation showed 
that about 50% of households who were induced to migrate in 2008 migrated again in 2009.  It 
would be difficult to generate such a high level of re-migration in a model without learning.  We also 
saw that the majority of households go back to work for the same employer in subsequent years, 
which suggests that the “learning” is individual-specific, and takes the form of a job connection. 
The learning effect generates additional testable implications. First, if we interpret learning as 
finding out if you can establish a network connection and then keeping that connection, we should 
see that the incentive has the largest impact on those that do not already have network connections 
at a destination – this is the group of households that have most to learn.  Second, learning should 
be apparent in the re-migration decision.  We should observe households who had a favorable 
resolution of the uncertainty associated with migration to have higher re-migration propensity, 
especially in the treatment group.  Third, we should see location-specific learning.  That is, 
households that migrate to a particular location (for exogenous reasons) should continue to re-
migrate to that location. 
Some of the empirical tests implied by the learning assumptions carry an additional benefit in 
that they help distinguish our model’s predictions from that of the most closely competing 
explanation.  That alternative model is a simple liquidity constraint (i.e. no money for a bus ticket) 
preventing migration.  In that model, re-migration without the $8.50 incentive in 2009 and 2011 
would have to be related to savings from the 2008 migration that gets used for a bus ticket the next 
year.  However, savings from prior period migration operates similarly to an unconditional transfer 
policy, and as our analysis showed, those savings would have to be very large to generate the same 
degree of re-migration.  Furthermore, location-specific learning and learning from the experiences of 
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others are not necessarily implied by the simple liquidity constraint model, and one would have to 
add a learning component to that model to get those predictions. 
6. Additional Tests of the Model 
In summary, our model assumes that households in Rangpur know that there are potentially 
high returns from migration. They also know that there is a potential downside. Given how close 
some of them are to subsistence during the Monga season, a failed migration episode would be 
disastrous. In this situation the incentive we provided is enough to cover a bus ticket plus a little 
food, and therefore sufficient to rule out the disaster.  This enables households to experiment and to 
discover whether they are able to make an ongoing profit from seasonal migration.  If this simple 
description is correct, then the following additional predictions emerge:   
 
Prediction 1: Cash and Credit treatments should have a similar impact on migration rates; 
Prediction 2: The incentive should have a larger effect on households that are close to 
subsistence; 
Prediction 3: The incentive should have a larger impact on households that do not have 
network connections at the destination;  
Prediction 4: Households should exhibit learning in their re-migration choices, including 
location specific learning; 
Prediction 5: Migration should be more responsive to a conditional incentive than an 
unconditional transfer; and 
Prediction 6: Households should be very responsive to an explicit insurance program that 
covers losses from migration. 
 
Predictions 1-4 can be tested with our data, while predictions 5 and 6 require new experiments. 
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6.1.  Tests of Predictions 1-2: Treatment and Migrant Heterogeneity 
 
The first prediction of our model has already been verified. The migration rate in the cash 
treatment is 59.0% while in the credit treatment it is 56.8% and the difference is not statistically 
significant. This is consistent with the claim that the cash and credit treatments should have similar 
effects on the migration rate, with the credit treatment being slightly less effective.  
The second prediction of the model is that those who are close to subsistence should be less 
likely to migrate prior to the program, but these same households should be most responsive to the 
incentive. We use the portion of total household expenditure spent on food at baseline as a measure 
of how close the household is to subsistence. Panel A in Figure 8 shows kernel density plots of the 
distribution of this index among migrant (solid blue line) and non-migrant (dotted red line) 
households.  Proximity to subsistence (food exp./total exp.) increases to the right along the x-axis.  
The plot on the right in Panel A shows that in control villages, households close to 
subsistence are less likely to migrate. The plot of the left shows - using the same kernel density 
drawn for treatment villages - that once the $8.50 incentive is assigned, the discrepancy in the 
migrant/non-migrant distributions disappears. In other words, the treatment has the largest effect 
on households close to subsistence, and induces precisely those households to migrate.  These two 
plots are therefore consistent with the pair of statements embodied in prediction 2.   
In Panel B of Figure 8, we show the regression-based evidence on this same theoretical 
prediction.  We run a regression of the form: 
 Migrantivj=α+ β1 Incentivev+β2 Subsistenceivj+β3 Incentivev·Subsistenceivj+ ߛXivj + φj + ߝivj 
where subsistence is a measure of the portion of expenditure spent on food as discussed above.  When 
the migration decision is regressed on treatment, subsistence, and the interaction effect between the 
two, we see a significant negative coefficient on subsistence, and a significant positive coefficient of 
the interaction term treatment*subsistence.  These are the two predictions from the theory.   
30 
 
In Panel C we show histograms of migration rates across different values of Food 
Exp./Total Exp. separately for treatment and control villages.  We see that in control villages (light 
blue), migration rate increases as we move away from subsistence, but that the treatment manages to 
flatten out this graph.  The treatment effects are largest in the part of the distribution where people 
are spending >95%, >75% or >50% of their expenditures on food alone.  
Next we examine the distribution of expenditures post-treatment (in the December 2008 
follow-up survey) to uncover the parts of the distribution that are affected most by the incentive.  
We plot the distribution of expenditures in the treatment villages, the distribution of expenditures in 
the control villages, and subtract the latter from the former.  The result – plotted in Figure 9 – 
mirrors what we find with respect to subsistence and the propensity to migrate.  We see that the 
treatment manages to decrease the population share of extremely poor households spending 
between 300 and 700 Taka ($5-$10) per person per month by about 11%, and increases the share of 
a less-poor category that spends 1200-1600 Taka ($17-23) per person per month by an (almost) 
equivalent 10%.  The treatment therefore seems to have the largest effect on (the consumption 
outcomes) of people in the 3rd-25th percentile of expenditures.  This is the same part of the 
distribution that was induced to migrate by the treatment.     
While these findings are supportive of predictions 1 and 2, they are not conclusive because 
omitted variables may be correlated with both subsistence and the effect of the incentive.   
6.2. Tests of Predictions 3-4: Learning 
 
The third implication of our model is that the incentive should have a larger effect on those 
households that do not have connections at the destination and therefore have more to learn – or 
equivalently, households that potential employers need to learn more about.  In other words, the 
treatment should induce households who are still uncertain whether their realization will be g or b.  
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Table 7 provides evidence on this conjecture. In this table we compare the characteristics of 
migrants in the control group (the “regular migrants” who migrate without any incentive) to 
migrants in the treatment group (a combination of “regular” migrants and people “induced” to 
migrate through the $8.50 treatment).  We see that the incentive led to an increase in the number of 
households migrating that do not know someone at the destination and that do not already have a 
job lead at the destination. The table reports these statistics separately by the order of the migration 
episode within the first follow up survey.  The first migration episode is presumably the one most 
affected by our incentive. During the first episode, the “induced” migrants are clearly much less 
likely to have network support or job connections at the destination.  These differences between 
treatment and control group migrants persist until the third episode, and after that the induced 
migrants appear to catch up.  
All these observations are again consistent with our model. The bottom panel also shows 
that treatment group migrants are less likely to travel alone. In summary, these results suggest that 
our treatment managed to induce households who were otherwise less comfortable migrating: 
people without access to substitute forms of insurance through job connections and social networks.   
A fourth prediction of our model is that households should exhibit learning in their 
decisions on whether and where to re-migrate.  Households that are successful in 2008 should be 
more likely to migrate in 2009, and this effect should be more pronounced among the incentivized 
migrants. Figure 10 provides evidence in favor of these conjectures. Panel A examines the 2009 re-
migration decision of households as a function of the migration earnings/savings outcomes in 2008.  
Regardless of the measure of migration success used (total or per-day earnings or savings), re-
migrants have a “success” distribution that is shifted to the right.  The regression version of these 
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figures19 (see table 8) shows that if a household is induced to migrate by the treatment, then it is 45 
percentage points more likely to re-migrate the following year.  The re-migration probability 
increases by a further 19 percentage points if the original experience is “successful” (i.e. results in 
above-median earnings).20   
Panel B in Figure 10 shows that the learning effect is only present in treatment villages. 
Treated households that re-migrate are those that were successful in the first round. In contrast, the 
distribution of 2008 earnings is no different between 2009 re-migrants and non-remigrants in the 
control villages.  This is consistent with the model and the idea that the treatment households have 
something to learn, while the non-treatment villages do not. 
Finally, the theory also suggests that households should learn about destinations. In table 9 
we study household destination choices among re-migrants in 2009.  For each of the four major 
destinations, we estimate a separate model of the probability that the migrant returns to that same 
destination in 2009 as a function of whether he migrated to that destination in 2008 (in an OLS 
model), or whether he was induced to migrate to that destination in 2008 by our treatments (where the 
2008 migration decision is instrumented with both the village-level cash/credit treatments as well as 
the individual level “destination restriction” treatment).  The last 4 rows of table 9 repeat these same 
four models except that the dependent variables are destination choices in 2011 rather than 2009.   
We see that the choice to return to Dhaka and Tangail (two of the four major destinations) is 
persistent: if the randomized treatment induced households to send a migrant to either of these 
cities in 2008, then those migrants are very highly likely to return to those same cities in 2009, and 
                                                 
19 The regression equation is Migrant2009=α+ρ1 Migrant2008+ρ2 Migrant2008·Success2008+ φj + εivj.  In this equation, Migrant2008 is instrumented 
with the randomized village-level treatments, and Migrant*Success is instrumented with the interaction of those treatments with 
success.  Later specifications in table 8 introduce the effects of friends’ experience, which are instrumented with the household-
specific randomized treatments such as the requirements to migrate with a group or to a specific destination (see figure 2). 
20 The 45 percentage point “self-migration” effect dominates the effects of friends or relatives migrating in 2008, (which increase 
2009 migration by only a statistically insignificant -5 to +8 percentage points).  This again suggests that a person-specific outcome 
(such as a job connection to an employer) is the key source of uncertainty, rather than a general lack of information about 
opportunities at the destination.  The within-village randomized intervention conditions (such as the destination and group 
restrictions – see Figure 2) allows us to study the effects of friends migrating using IV. 
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then again in 2011.  Migrants induced to travel to Bogra or Munshigonj in 2008 were not as 
enamored with those options; in fact people induced to travel to Munshigonj become less likely to 
return in future years.  This is important evidence of migrants acquiring destination-specific 
information, skill or capital after being induced to migrate by our treatment.   
Table 10 aggregates across the four destinations and runs a simpler model of the decision to 
return to the same destination, and shows that households’ learn from both their own experience 
and their friends’.  Households are more likely to experiment with a destination where their friends 
experienced success in a prior year.  
6.3  Tests of Predictions 5-6: Unconditional Credit and Insurance 
 
To test predictions 5 and 6, we examine the migration responsiveness to new treatments 
applied in March 2011, just prior to the second (minor) lean season that corresponds to the pre-
harvest period for a second rice harvest known as Boro.  In this round of experiments, we repeated 
the credit incentive treatment (of 800 Taka) from 2008 in some households, but also added two new 
treatments: (1) Un-conditional credit of the same amount (800 Taka) not tied to any migration 
requirement, and (2) a migration insurance program that attempts to explicitly cover losses 
associated with migration. 
The insurance program offers the same 800 Taka loan up front conditional on migration, 
but the loan repayment requirement is conditioned on measured rainfall conditions.  Excessive 
rainfall is an important external event that adversely affects labor demand and work opportunities at 
the destination.  Rain makes it more difficult to engage in unskilled wage work at outdoor 
construction sites (e.g. breaking bricks), it both increases the cost of pulling rickshaws and lowers 
the demand for a rickshaw, and if the excessive rain turns to floods it can even delay crop cultivation 
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and lower agricultural labor demand.  Index insurance based on measured rainfall helps us 
circumvent moral hazard problems associated with insuring individual outcomes. 
We purchased 10 years of daily rainfall data for Bogra (a popular migration destination) from 
the local meteorological department, imputed the probability distribution of rainy days during the 
pre-harvest migration period, and calculated the actuarially fair insurance premium and payoff 
amounts.  Our contract then stipulated that if the rainfall in Bogra remains within “normal” range – 
0-5 days during March-April - then the migrants would need to pay back Tk.950 (i.e. repay the loan 
with some interest).  If it rained between 5 and 10 days, the borrower would have to repay Tk.714. If 
the number of rainy days exceeded 10, then the borrower would only need to repay Tk.640.21  
Table 11 shows the basic take-up results for the 2011 interventions, where migration is 
regressed on the randomized treatments.22, 23  The simple credit incentive (800 Taka conditional on 
migration) again led to a statistically significant 17.5 percentage point increase in the propensity to 
migrate relative to the control group.  In contrast, the unconditional credit program led to only a 7.4 
percentage point increase, and the effect is not different from zero.  These results are consistent 
with prediction 5: that incentives should have stronger effects than un-conditional transfers.   This 
result is important because it shows that households can remain in the “poverty trap” in our model 
despite having substantial variation in yearly income.   
The insurance contract increases the migration rate by 15.7 percentage points and this is 
statistically the same as the response to the credit incentive. Furthermore, table 11 shows that this 
                                                 
21 Note that the contract can be explained to borrowers like a standard credit contract, and the insurance feature is only introduced 
because the credit repayment is state contingent. This helps to avoid confusion about the concept of insurance (Gine & Yang, 2009). 
22 The estimating equation is of the following form: ܯ݅݃ݎܽ݊ݐ2011௜௝ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߠܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁2011௜௩ ൅ ߚଵܫ݉݌ݑݎ݁ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜௩ ൅ ߚଶߣ௝ ൅ ߚଷߝ௜௩ , 
where ܯ݅݃ݎܽ݊ݐ2011௜௝ is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one member of household i in locality j  migrated in 2011 and 0 
otherwise. ܫ݊ܿ݁݊ݐ݅ݒ݁2011௜௩ is a vector of binary variables representing random assignment to receive conditional credit, rainfall 
insurance, or unconditional credit in 2010; omitted category is control and information on job leads in 2011. ܫ݉݌ݑݎ݁ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜௩ is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if randomly assigned to control group in 2011and incentivized in 2008 (omitted category is “pure control” 
which is equal to 1 if randomly assigned to control group or job leads in 2008 and in 2011); ߣ௝ is sub-district fixed effects and ߝ௜௩ is a 
mean-zero error term. 
23 The 2011 interventions are offered in March to induce migration during the lesser lean period prior to the Boro harvest while the 
2008 interventions were offered for migration in October (prior to the Aman harvest).  The level effects are therefore not directly 
comparable across the two years, and we only compare across treatments within the same year. 
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average effect masks some significant (and sensible) variation.  In particular, designing the insurance 
contract on the basis of rainfall measured in one particular destination (Bogra) leads to significant 
“basis risk” (risk of contractual non-performance) for farmers migrating to other destinations whose 
rainfall may only be weakly correlated to the rainfall in Bogra.  To study heterogeneity in treatment 
response due to this basis risk, we add interaction terms between the insurance treatment and an 
indicator for households who had expressed interest in traveling to Bogra in our original baseline 
(July 2008).  The last two columns of Table 12 show these effects for non-farmers (on whom extra 
rainfall poses the biggest risk) and for farmers separately.             
The results indicate that households for whom the design of the insurance contract is most 
appropriate - i.e. non-farmers traveling to Bogra for whom basis risk is minimized – respond very 
strongly to the insurance program.  The insurance contract increases the migration rate of non-
farmers by 24.3 percentage points (for comparison, the analogous effect for the credit incentive was 
6.0 percentage points).  Furthermore, offering the 800 Taka insurance contract to non-farmers who 
reported back in 2008 that they planned to travel to Bogra leads to a statistically significant 52 
percentage point increase in their migration rate.    
In summary, this sub-section presents experiment-based evidence that Rangpur households 
are strongly responsive to an appropriately designed migration insurance program that addresses the 
downside risk to migration, exactly as predicted by our simple model.  We view this evidence to be 
powerful because the received wisdom about insurance programs in developing countries is that 
people are generally reluctant to purchase insurance (Gine et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2010), and that 
adding an insurance component to a credit contract actually reduces adoption (Gine & Yang, 2009).  
Against this backdrop, we find that the migration response to explicit insurance is just as strong as 
the response to credit (with implicit limited liability) across the whole sample, and that once basis 
risk is minimized, the response to the explicit insurance contract is even stronger.   
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7. Alternative Explanations 
 
A plausible alternative explanation for our empirical results is that households face a strong 
liquidity constraint – they simply do not have the 600 Taka required to pay for a bus ticket and 
therefore cannot migrate. Relieving the liquidity constraint one year could lead to ongoing migration 
either through learning as discussed above or because increased income relaxes the liquidity 
constraint again the following year.24  Such an explanation can account for the majority of our facts.  
Nevertheless, we do not think a liquidity constraint is the correct explanation for these 
results. We rule out this explanation because year on year variation in incomes is large relative to the 
incentive that we provided.25  For the median households (with annual expenditures of 45000 Taka), 
our transfer was less than 1.5% of yearly expenditure. Alternatively, if a median household were to 
save an equal portion each week of the year it would mean reducing expenditures from around 860 
to 849 Taka. This seems to be a small portion of income.  That is, we would expect households 
amenable to migration to have received a sufficiently large income shock in the past to have 
overcome the liquidity constraint and moved to the rich equilibrium prior to our intervention. With 
a simple liquidity constraint story it is difficult to explain why there are large numbers of households 
that are not currently migrating, but are willing to be persuaded.  This argument suggests that it is 
not the cash transfer aspect of our treatments that is important but rather the incentive aspect 
highlighted in our model (the fact transfers were conditional on migration).   We provided direct 
evidence that this is the case when we compared a conditional and unconditional credit treatment.  
Consistent with the idea that liquidity constraints are not key, we showed that the conditional credit 
treatment has a much stronger impact on migration rates. 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that some form of credit constraint is required for our poverty trap model to work. The liquidity constraint 
discussed here is a more severe form of credit constraint. 
25 Average absolute deviation in weekly expenditure across seasons in our sample is 307 Taka between rounds one and two and 368 
Taka between rounds two and three. The standard deviation of absolute deviation in consumption is 635 and 508 Taka respectively. 
While part of this is no doubt driven by measurement error, these figures indicate that season-on-season variation in incomes is 
large relative to the 600 Taka of our incentive. 
37 
 
The discussion above applies equally to any mechanism that does not emphasize the 
incentive effect of our treatments. This observation, however, raises a perhaps troubling point for 
our preferred model. The basic argument against 600 Taka having a large effect in the form of a 
transfer is that yearly variation in income is larger. Therefore, for our incentive to work it must be 
the case that many households would prefer to keep a once off transfer of 600 Taka rather than 
spend it on migration. But this implies that the welfare impact of our intervention is bounded above 
by the benefit of giving each household 600 Taka to use as they please, which according to our 
model will lead most to remain in a “poverty trap”.  This point is of course obvious in a fully 
rational model because households always prefer to have money without constraints. We leave it to 
the reader to determine whether they believe that it is reasonable to assume this. Alternative models 
that posit less rationality, either in the form of loss aversion, excessive impatience (δ low), non-
rational expectations (μ(b) too low) or some reason why the household is consistently on the poverty 
line despite variation in income [for example, hyperbolic discounting a´la (Laibson, 1997; Duflo et 
al., 2011)] can make some room for policy makers to believe that the welfare gains of this 
intervention are larger than the purely rational model would imply. 
 
8. Conclusions 
We conducted a randomized experiment in which we incentivized households in a famine-
prone region of Bangladesh to send a seasonal migrant to an urban area. The main results show that 
a small incentive led to a large increase in the number of seasonal migrants, that the migration was 
successful (in terms of improving consumption by around 30%), and that households given the 
incentive in one year continued to be more likely to migrate in future years. 
We argue that the results are consistent with a simple (rational) model of a poverty trap 
where households that are close to subsistence are unable to learn whether migration is successful 
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due to a small possibility that migrating will turn out badly, leaving households consumption below 
subsistence.  The model helps us to understand the type of situation in which we would expect 
incentive and insurance policies to lead to the sorts of long-term effects observed in our experiment. 
We should look for situations in which there is household specific learning, where households are 
close to subsistence and where there is a reasonable chance of a negative outcome from investment. 
These predictions also provide an answer to the puzzle that motivated the entire project: why does 
Rangpur – the poorest region of the country - have a lower migration rate compared to the rest of 
Bangladesh? Our model suggests that this is because households in Rangpur are close to subsistence 
at the time when it makes most sense to migrate.  This can also explain other peculiar migration 
patterns noticed in the literature – the lower out-migration rate among poorer Europeans (Hatton & 
Williamson, 1998) and poorer South-Africans (Ardington et al., 2009).   
Banerjee and Duflo (2007) also pose this puzzle in describing the lives of the poor – “Why 
Don’t the Poor Migrate for Longer…given that they could easily earn much more by doing so?”, and conclude that 
“The ultimate reason seems to be that making more money is not a … large enough priority to experience several 
months of living alone and often sleeping on the ground somewhere in or around the work premises.”  The migration 
experience is almost certainly unpleasant for the household in ways not captured by our 
consumption and income measures, but the preferences revealed by the persistent voluntary re-
migration of our sample households after incentives are removed suggest that some constraint or 
barrier also played a part in their decision not to migrate.26  The persistence of voluntary re-migration is 
also informative in that it makes it unlikely that households were fooled by one unusually good year, 
and that observation rules out simpler explanations for our findings of the flavor that migration was 
actually not beneficial.   
                                                 
26 Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) argue that the lack of long-term permanent migration may reflect the value of remaining close to 
one’s social network.  However, the circular, seasonal migration we induce should not lead to a loss of social network ties. 
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Our intervention mitigates the spatial mismatch between where people live, and where jobs 
are during the pre-harvest months. This approach may be of relevance to other countries that face 
geographic concentrations of poverty, such as northern Nigeria, eastern islands of Indonesia, 
northeast India, southeast Mexico, and inland southwest China (Jalan & Ravallion, 1999).  More 
generally, providing credit to enable households to search for jobs, and aid spatial and seasonal 
matching between employers and employees may be a useful way to augment the microcredit 
concept currently more narrowly focused on creating new entrepreneurs and new businesses.   
Our results support a policy of providing micro-insurance that mitigates the potential 
downside of experimentation. Our analysis also suggests that such a policy will be particularly 
beneficial where households are close to subsistence, risk averse and could benefit from a 
technology that requires individual level experimentation in order to determine profitability. 
For the specific case of the Monga famine in Bangladesh, the migration support programs 
we implement appear more cost-effective than subsidizing food purchases on an ongoing basis, 
which is the major anti-famine policy tool currently employed by the Bangladesh government 
(Government of Bangladesh 2005; Khandker & Mahmud, forthcoming).  The scale of our 
experiment does not permit us to analyze potential adverse general equilibrium effects in destination 
labor markets when such a program is scaled up.  There is mixed evidence in the literature on 
whether these effects are substantial (Borjas, 2003; Borjas & Katz, 2007; Card, 2009; Ottaviano & 
Peri, 2011).  There is also evidence of large spillover benefits of emigration at the origin (Hatton & 
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Appendix 1: Description of 2008 Treatments 
 
Out of the 100 villages selected to participate in the study, 16 (304 households) were assigned to the 
control group, while the remaining 84 villages (1596 households) were assigned to one of three 
treatments: 
 
Information (16 villages/304 households): Potential migrants were provided with information on 
the types of jobs available in each of four areas: Bogra, Dhaka, Munshigonj and Tangail.  In 
addition, they were told the likelihood of finding such a job, and the average daily wage in each job.  
This information was provided using the following script: 
“We would like to give you information on job availability, types of jobs available and approximate 
wages in four regions – Bogra, Dhaka, Munshigonj and Tangail. They are not in any particular order. 
NGOs working in those areas collected this information at the beginning of this month.  
Three most commonly available jobs in Bogra are: a) rickshaw pulling, b) construction work, c) 
agricultural labor. The average wage rates per day are Tk. 150 to 200 for rickshaw pulling, Tk.120 to 150 
for construction work, and Tk. 80 to 100 for agricultural laborer. The likelihood of getting such a job in 
Bogra is medium (not high/not low).   
Three most commonly available jobs in Dhaka are: a) rickshaw pulling, b) construction work, c) day 
labor. The average wage rates per day are Tk. 250 to 300 for rickshaw pulling, Tk.200 to 250 for 
construction work, and Tk. 150 to 200 for day laborer. The likelihood of getting such a job in Dhaka is 
high.  
Three most commonly available jobs in Munshigonj are: a) rickshaw pulling, b) land preparation for 
potato cultivation, c) agricultural laborer. The average wage rates per day are Tk. 150 to 200 for rickshaw 
pulling, Tk.150 to 160 for land preparation, and Tk. 150 to 160 for agricultural laborer. The likelihood of 
getting such a job in Munshigonj is high.  
Three most commonly available jobs in Tangail are: a) rickshaw pulling, b) construction work, c) day 
laborer in brick fields. The average wage rates per day are Tk. 200 to 250 for rickshaw pulling, Tk.160 to 
180 for construction work, and Tk. 150 to 200 for brick field work. The likelihood of getting such a job 
in Tangail is medium (not high/not low).  
Based on the above information, would you/any member of your family like to any of the above 
location during this monga season? If so, where do you want to go? Note that the job market 
information given above might have changed or may change in the near future and there is no guarantee 
that you will find a job, and we’re just providing you the best information available to us. Note also that 
we or the NGOs that collected this information will not provide you with any assistance in finding jobs 
in the destination.” 
 
Cash (37 villages/703 households): Households were read the same script on job availability as 
given above, and were also offered a cash grant of Taka 600 conditional on migration. This money 
was provided at the origin prior to migration, and was framed as defraying the travel cost (money for 
a bus ticket).  Migrants had an opportunity to receive Taka 200 more if they reported to us at the 
destination.  
Credit (31 villages/589 households): Households were read the same script on job availability as 
given above, and were also offered a zero interest loan of Taka 600 conditional on migration. This 
money was provided at the origin prior to migration, and was framed as defraying the travel cost 
(money for a bus ticket).  Migrants had an opportunity to receive Taka 200 more if they reported to 
us at the destination. Households were told that they would have to pay back the loan at the end of 
the Monga season.   
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Figure 4: The return to migration as a function of income








(1)              Long run income for people with realization g
(2)              Long run income for people with realization b
Average long run income (weighted by μ(g) and μ(b))
Figure 6: Effects of Various Policies on Migration
Unconditional Transfer
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u = ln, μ(g) = 0.7, b = -0.2, g = 0.05 and δ = 0.7
y (Initial Income) y (Initial Income)
Figure 7: Similar Effects of Transfers and Incentives Farther from Subsistence
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Subsistence is defined as percentage of food expenditures on total expenditures












Panel A: Migration Rat s and Baseline Subsistence Level (by Tr atment Status)
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Figure 9: Shift in the Distribution of Household Expenditures Per Capita 
(Treatment minus Control) 
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Distribution of Total EarningsPanel B: Effect of Migration Success in 2008 n Remigration, Treatment and Control
Diff  I v NI  P‐value
Cash Credit Control Info
Food Expenditures  805.86 813.65 818.68 768.64 15.84 0.638
(19.16) (40.91) (31.76) (18.00) (33.57)
Non Food Expenditures 248.98 262.38 248.4 237.35 12.23 0.278
(5.84) (6.74) (9.28) (7.99) (11.20)
Total Expenditure 1054.83 1076.03 1067.08 1005.99 28.06 0.465
(21.11) (42.08) (34.55) (22.77) (38.29)
Calorie intake per person per day 2081.19 2079.51 2099.3 2021.31 20.25 0.585
(20.34) (22.76) (30.44) (32.56) (36.99)
45.66 45.3 46.26 44.75 ‐0.01 0.992
(0.54) (0.57) (0.77) (0.85) (0.92)
Expenditures on Meat Products 25.04 18.24 27.13 20.71 ‐1.97 0.594
(2.58) (2.0) (3.24) (2.90) (3.69)
Expenditures  on Milk & Eggs 11.74 9.77 9.96 10.77 0.48 0.675
(0.79) (0.80) (1.12) (1.19) (1.13)
Expenditures on Fish 42.17 39.86 41.36 45.98 ‐2.56 0.496
(1.83) (1.79) (2.76) (2.89) (3.74)
Expenditure on Children's Education 24.14 27.14 22.31 16.95 6.01 0.016**
(1.75) (2.31) (2.34) (2.1) (2.44)
Expenditures on Clothing and Shoes 37.31 38.8 39.24 38.35 ‐0.80 0.693
(0.79) (0.90) (1.41) (1.30) (2.02)
Expenditures on Health for Male 52.39 52.9 63.72 47.45 ‐2.86 0.696
(5.14) (5.23) (8.15) (6.48) (7.28)
Expenditures on Health for Female 37.34 52.5 39.36 49.75 ‐0.31 0.961
(3.52) (5.75) (5.68) (7.51) (6.26)
Total Saving per HH 1345.55 1366.37 1418.29 1611.05 ‐160.56 0.255
(97.54) (121.26) (135.04) (185.56) (140.09)
HH size 3.93 3.98 3.99 4.05 ‐0.07 0.473
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
HH Head Education  1=Educated  0.25 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.628
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Number of Males  Age>14  1.19 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.03 0.515
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Number of Children   Age<9  1.01 1.05 1.08 1.15 ‐0.09 0.093
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Household has pucca walls  0.29 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.02 0.55
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Literacy score  average  3.37 3.40 3.48 3.30 ‐0.01 0.84
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
78.79 78.62 78.38 75.72 1.66 0.47
(0.77) (0.88) (1.15) (1.35) (2.32)
58.53 60.82 58.38 57.40 1.68 0.41
(1.07) (1.21) (1.64) (1.61) (2.04)
52.53 52.90 52.42 51.15 0.91 0.70
(1.13) (1.25) (1.78) (1.72) (2.40)
0.77 0.75 0.77 0.77 ‐0.01 0.21
(0.003) (0.09) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
6.53 6.49 6.24 6.20 0.27 0.24
(0.05) (0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.23)
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 ‐0.00 0.75
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.68 0.65 0.70 0.60 0.02 0.55
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Migration to Bogra in round 1 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.30





































































Dependent Variable OLS OLS IV IV Mean IV Mean
102.714*** 115.073*** 280.792** 260.139** 199.360**
(17.147) (17.170) (131.954) (128.053) (96.529)
59.085*** 67.187*** 115.003** 99.924* 78.676
(8.960) (8.693) (56.692) (51.688) (64.426)
160.696*** 180.894*** 391.193** 355.115** 278.036**
(22.061) (21.432) (169.431) (158.835) (131.800)
350.271*** 383.331*** 872.820*** 788.118*** 466.420**
(41.971) (43.225) (243.244) (245.798) (211.315)
7.516*** 8.283*** 18.235*** 16.380** 9.414**
(1.022) (1.050) (6.962) (6.730) (4.420)
4.497 6.842 32.787 35.208 10.284
(3.970) (4.163) (21.577) (21.416) (15.395)
2.005 1.330 ‐4.646 ‐6.776 13.947
(1.719) (1.709) (9.200) (9.145) (11.505)
10.119** 11.970*** 36.299 30.482 8.816
(3.879) (3.853) (24.899) (22.893) (19.683)
‐3.651 ‐5.087** 30.924** 21.552 0.963
(2.355) (2.424) (14.145) (13.541) (7.795)
10.671*** 11.131*** 11.329 9.409 3.408
(1.678) (1.641) (8.882) (8.359) (4.418)
‐10.932 ‐11.844 39.920 32.821 ‐37.139
(7.250) (7.551) (40.482) (41.732) (63.125)
22.823** 24.566*** 23.653 7.562 98.051**
(9.180) (9.336) (37.574) (39.319) (49.793)
Sub‐district Fixed Effects? yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no yes no yes yes


























































3490.47 3506.59 3434.94 71.65 951
(97.22) (110.83) (202.80) (232.91)
7777.19 7451.27 8894.40 ‐1443.129** 952
(244.77) (264.99) (586.14) (583.83)
Savings per day  56.96 56.56 58.37 ‐1.81 902
(1.16) (1.29) (2.58) (2.8)
Earnings per day  99.39 96.09 111.15 ‐15.06** 926
(1.75) (1.92) (4.0) (4.2)
Remittances per day  18.34 16.94 23.33 ‐6.39** 927
(1.06) (1.19) (2.28) (2.55)
Travel Cost per Episode 264.55 264.12 266.00 ‐1.88 953










Sector Dhaka Mushigonj Tangail  Bogra Other
Total 
earnings
Agriculture 17.54 75 91.15 89.62 46.83 3230.52
(1.71) (2.50) (1.89) (2.26) (2.26) (77.68)
Non‐ag day laborer 20.56 9 5.75 3.83 19.02 6039.72
(1.82) (1.66) (1.55) (1.42) (1.78) (317.52)
Transport 40.93 11 1.33 1.09 15.34 4993.81
(2.21) (1.81) (0.76) (0.77) (1.63) (203.12)
Other 20.97 5 1.77 5.46 18.81 5645.98
(1.83) (1.26) (0.88) (1.68) (1.77) (321.72)
Number of migration 
episodes 496 300 226 183 489 1,694
Total earnings 5005.06 3777.30 2897.88 2491.07 5160.60
(185.92) (156.0) (145.72) (123.19) (188.69)




First Episode  47% 64% 17***
(1.85) (3.29) (3.86)
Second  Episode  60% 73% 13**
(2.47) (5) (5.90)
Third Episode  69% 85% 16*
(4) (6.27) (8.69)
Fourth Episode  86% 94% 8
(6.09) (6.25) (9.85)
Incentive Non incentive Diff
First Episode  27% 44% 17***
(1.64) (3.41) (3.55)
Second  Episode  29% 47% 18**
(2.28) (5.58) (5.64)
Third Episode  39% 53% 15** 
(4.24) (8.69) (9.44)
Fourth Episode  54% 56% 2.00
(8.54) (12.81) (15.32)
Incentive Non incentive Diff
First Episode  32% 38% 6**
(1.25) (2.52) (2.75)
Second  Episode  34% 49% 15***
(1.49) (3.33) (3.52)
Third Episode  36% 60% 24***
(2.23) (4.32) (4.81)
Fourth Episode  54% 83% 29***
(3.95) (4.40) (6.52)






Table 7. Differences in Characteristics Between Migrants in 
Treatment and in Control Group
Table 8. Learning from Own Experience and Friends' Experience in 2009 Re-migration Decision
Dep. Var.: Migration in 2009 OLS IV OLS IV IV IV IV
0.438*** 0.480*** 0.473*** 0.435*** 0.473*** 0.435*** 0.457***















Constant 0.111*** 0.110 0.127*** 0.112 0.0758 0.0955 0.0862
(0.0374) (0.0810) (0.0313) (0.0743) (0.0714) (0.0727) (0.0712)
Sub‐district fixed effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,829 1,829 1,810 1,810 1,775 1,775 1,775









































































































Observations 2,407 1,085 1,314














Table 11. Treatment Effects in 2011 Accounting for basis risk in the Insurance 
Program
Went to Bogra before baseline 
Conditional credit
Rain insurance
Unconditional credit
Constant
